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The Finite-Infinite God

of Edgar Sheffidd Brightman
By ARTHUR CARL

PIBPKORN

A MONG the noteworthy deaths of last year was that of Edgar
£\. Sheffield Brighanan, from 1919 to his death Borden
Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, who died at the age of 68 on February 25, 1953. Born in
1884 and educated at Brown, Boston, Berlin, and Marburg Universities, he exerted great influence both on American Protestant
theology and on American philosophy. As a philosopher he was
one of the most articulate exponents of Personalism. In the field
of religion, he will be remembered for having popularized among
American Protestant theologians and clergymen the concept of
a finite God, that is, "a god whose power is limited by realities
which he did not create." 1
Ever since 1880, and especially during the past quarter century,
the doctrine of a .finite - or finite-in.finite - God has become inaeasingly fashionable in ProteStant theological circles as well as
among theistic philosophers. It is explicit not only in the philosophy
of Brighanan, but in varying degrees also in the philosophies, to
cite only some of many, of James Ward, F. R. Tennant,:! and Alfred
North Whitehead,11 all of which posit a finite or a merely immanent God;' of William Pepperell Monraguc,11 Radoslav A. TsanoJl,0
Francis Herbert Bradley,7 Henri Bcrgson,8 and Peter Anthony Bertocci.0 It dominates much liberal Protestant theological thinking.
Its influence manifests itself, for instance, in W. R. Matthews 10
and others who reject divine impassibility; in Edward Scribner
Ames' temporalistic the.i.sm,11 and in Charles Hartshorne's panpsych.i.stic panenthe.i.sm.12
Others whom Brighanan himself claimed on behalf of the doctrine of a finite God are Paul Elmer More, Raphael Demos, Georgia
Harkness, Hastings Rashdall, Nicholas Berdyaev, Paul Tillich, William Kelly Wright, John Bennett, Robert L Calhoun (who speaks
of "rigidities" within God), Henry Nelson Wieman ( with his im28
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personal naturalistic conception of God), and Vergilius Ferm.
Brightman also finds support for a tempomlist God in the traditional theist Franz Brentano, who suggested that the imperfection
of the world is a token of a God whose works are becoming infinitely more perfect.13 "This," says Brightman, "points to a God
who is in some sense actually developing and growing." He also
notes that John M. E. McTaggart- while rejecting a Creator,
because this postulates the reality of time, which McTaggart denied - held that a finite God is logicalt, preferable to an infinite one.i.a

I
It is useful, in view both of Brightman's influence and of Brightman's death, to inquire in some detail inro his concept of a finiteinfinite God as the Controller of The Given.
In the minds of its exponents the doctrine of a. finite God is
a kind of theodicy, a. defense and a. vindication of His goodness.
Brightman himself was a devout Methodist, a. regular worshiper
at divine service, and a philosopher whose sensitive nature was
appalled by the tragedy of the world. "So, it would seem, he
sought tO absolve the Deity from responsibility by demoting him
from some of his own powers." 111 In A Philosoph1 of Religion,
Brightman himself sets forth the utility of his hypothesis under
five heads: 10
First, he declares, ii docs not need to deri11c an1 of its basic
f,o,,i
e11idence
011, ig11orance. All that it asserts is based on an interpretation of actual experience. We do not need to wait for the
fuller light of immortality ro make clear what we do not now
know. The· 11ol1mt11s Dei does not have tO be the IIS'Jl#m igno-

rtmtiae.
Second, Brightman affirms, the s,wd, ( that is, superftuous) eflils
11re not tJScribed to the will of God. Hisrorically, the doctrine of
a finite God has usually been bom out of the consideration of the
problem of evil. Our human experience includes not only God's
goodness, but also "alcohol and syphilis, insanity and arteriosclerosis, or their equivalents." We have the choice of following
Schopenhauer and believing God "either must have an element of
malice in his nature and be possessed by a devil, or else he must
be suffering from some harsh necessities of existence which he did
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol25/iss1/2
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not create." According to Brightman, "traditional theism exalts the
omnipotence of God but obscures his moral perfection by leaving
it in an unintelligible relation to the evils of existence." The
docuine of a finite God "exalts God's moral perfection, denies
his omnipotence, but ascribes to him sufficient power to solve all
problems and to bring good out of all evil." This supplies "a more
intelligible faith" and enables us "to feel a profounder religious
satisfaaion" than we could under the old view.17 The "truly futile
and purposeless evils of existence" are "God's suffering as well as
ours." 18
Third, according to Brightman, the etemal dis1i11c1io11, betw
een
what
and n,il is
We do not have to roke the
goodi.s
difficult position of absolute theism that all apparent evil is real
good, with its corollary danger of producing complete skepticism
about values.
Fourth, Brightman described his hypothesis as nn i11spiri11g etern
God's will is
challe,ige to
"an eternal, but suffering and limited, will for good, which has
never yet been broken by the struggle, but has moved on in loyalty
to reason and the eternal ideals of right. God is strong, buc tragic;
suffers, but conquers; meets obstacles, but controls himself and
them. Worship of such a God includes a sharing of his task and
of his unfailing purpose, as well as of his suffcring." 10 Since religious experience is basically "• faith that religious communion is
taking place" (italics not original), and "persons who believe that
God is finite are in no way precluded from such communion or
co-operation with God," it is perfealy possible not only for a believer in a finite God to enjoy religious experience but also for
"the very limitation on God's power . . . to increase our reverence
for his goodness." 20 On this point there is some contact between
believers in a finite God and those pragmatists who feel that the
orthodox view of God (as altogether immutable, absolute, wholly
independent, and utterly incapable of receiving any good from His
crearures) actually betrayed the religious values this view sought
to embody.
Fifth, Brightman pointed out, finitum is empirical. Religious
experience leads to a nnite God because "no possible experience
could reveal unlimited and absolute power." 31 We cnn best account
Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1954
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for the structure of our own experience, "which in the end is the
sole touchstone of truth," by the hypothesis that "God too is an
experient, whose action is limited by the content and by the possibilities of subsistence which he finds within himself as experient." 22
(Brightman defined an "experient" - the term is James Ward'sas ":my actual complex of awareness felt as a whole"; it is a unity
within itself by virtue of "its unique togetherness or its selfidentity." Experients range from "the lowest and simplest forms
of animal and perhaps of vegetable life" through persons to "the
supreme experient, God." Selves, that is, unified wholes of momentary experients, and persons, that is, selves capable of evaluating their valuations, emerge by self-identifying memory-linkages
which unify momentary experients with previous experients into
a larger whole. Experience includes content, form, and activity.
Since "God is the supreme expericnt, his content would include
awareness of all qualities in the universe; his form would include
all possible relations; and his activity would select from among the
qualities those of ideal value and would direct the cosmic process
toward their realization."):::: This empirical value of finitism,
Brightman argued, reflects the sources of the idea of a finite God
in the course of the last three generations: The awareness of the
suffering and waste in the prehuman and human struggle for
survival; a keen sense of the problem of suffering in and of man;
the development of modern physics, with the unpredictable behavior of q11a111a and the discovery of Heisenberg's "principle of
indeterminacy"; a heightened religious sensitivity to the goodness
of God; and an increasing confidence in empirical as against
"priori methods.24
To the foregoing five Brightman added a sixth value; finitism
is th, 011by logical al1ernali111 10 a narrow nalt'1alism and atheism.
One can accept the telic facts of experience and relegate the
dystelic faas into outer darkness; this is what they charge traditional theology with having done. "A more coherent view will
either eliminate God entirely or will recognize the fact of complex
structure and struggle within God. But when God is eliminated,
he soon reappears in some other form, Superman or Proletariat.
Empirical thinking may well find a finite God to be the most
comprehensive hypothesis for the interpretation of all the facts." 211
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol25/iss1/2
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oblem

rsonal

1bc doctrine of a finite God is new neither in the history of
religion nor in the history of philosophy. While Brightman went
too far in saying that all primitive gods were finite, certainly the
is as old as polytbeism,20 and Z.Oroastrianism's AhuraMuda was limited by the existence of Ahriman.
In the history of philosophy Brightman traced the concept of
a finite God back to the Phileb,u and Tima.111 of Plato, who
"preserves the goodness of God at the cost of metaphysical coherence," and who "seems to have believed that axiological coherence was more important than cosmological coherence." :rr
friend, co-religionist, and fellow-philosopher of Brightman, Cornelius Kruse, declares: "A close study of Plato, especially
Plato's TimtteN.S, sheds, I believe, much light on Brightman's valiant
attempt to find a solution for the problem of evil. Brightman went
a step beyond St. Thomas' attribution of the Platonic Ideas to the
mind of God: he placed the Platonic Stm/. confronting the
demiurge in Plato's Timtte11s also within the person of God himself. In fact, both the Ideas and the Surd, not too successfully
harmonized, it must be admitted, constitute the coeternal 'passive
given' factors within God, which his will did not create, but with
which, like a creative artist, recognizing both their responsiveness
and their recalcitrance, he must and does work." 28
Epicurus, despite his di.v:Jairo~rs, also had a finite God who
was "morally neutral." 20
Brightman found that among early Christian heretics Marcion
and Mani had finite gods, while Jakob Boehme, the seventeenth
century mystic, affirmed a "bitter torment," a "fire of anger,"
a "struggle within God." Brightman described some of the articles
in Pierre Bayle's Dicliomudr• his1oritJN• •I crilitJN• ( 1697) as
finitistic.
Of David Hume, Brightman said that his "exclusively analytic
method blinded him to a synoptic view," but that he came close
to affirming the logical necessity for a finite God.
It is true that in an obutw tlie111m Hume did speak of a God
"perfect in his finite capacity," but he does not develop the idea.
He also made Cleanthes say:
I scruple nor to allow that I have been apt to suspect the frequent
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repetition of the word i11fi11ils, which we meet with in all theological writen, to savor more of panegyric than of philosophy, and
that II.Of purposes of re:isoning, and even of religion, would be
better served were we to rest contented with more accurate and
more moderate expressions. The terms, ttd111ir.ablc, excel/0111, 111pe,/111i11eby gre111, ,uisc and hoby, these Sllfficiently fill the imaginations
of'men; 11.Dd anything beyond, besides that it leads into absurdities,
has no inftuence on the affections or sentiments. . . . If we abandon
all human 11.0alogy ... I am afraid we abnndon all religion, and
retain no conception of the great object of our adoration. If we
preserve human analogy, we must forever find it impossible to
reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes; much less, can we ever prove the latter from the former.
But supposing the Author of Nature to be finitely perfect, though
far exceeding mankind, a satisfactory account may then be given
of nanual 11.0d moral evil, and every untoward phenomenon be
explained and adjusted.30
Hume srood in a tradition of logicometaphysical skepticism that

had been arguing the issues here involved as far back as Carneades
of Cyrene in the second century before Our Lord.81
Brightman further pointed out that Samuel Clarke in A Demon11ra1ion of the Bsing 11ml, A11,;b,llion of God ( 1705) and Immanuel Kant in his Krilik tier ,e;nen V enitm/1 held that teleology
cannot prove an infinite and perfect cause of the world. Instead
of proceeding to the doctrine of a finite God toward which Kant
admitted that the evidence pointed, however, they discredited the
teleological proof, according to Brightman, because theistic absolutism, in view of the ontological argument, had too firm an
11 priori grip on their minds. He declared that what Kant called
the physico-theological argument for God's existence is more
satisfactory than the ontological or cosmological arguments.
Its failure to demonstrate the omnipotent God of the ontological
argument, instead of being a defect, as has been supposed, may
be a revealing insight into the truth that divine value is not unlimited in power, but has to contend against a cosmic drag.=
According to Brightman, the Hegelian dialectic- Brightman
here admittedly went beyond Hegel himself- "points to antitheses, negativities and conflicts within God." Brightman further
quoted Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling as talking about Jia
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol25/iss1/2
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goe11licht1 Un11em1mfl and tler got1t1licht1 U,m,ille. He also quoted
John Stuart Mill that "it is not too much to say that every indication
of Design in the Kos.mos is so much evidence against the Omnipotence of the Designer." 33 Brightman likewise recalled F. C. S.
Schiller's assertion that a finite god "may be proved." :w William
James (who may have been influenced by John Stuart Mill) admittedly exerted a strong influence on Brightman. The latter made
much of a statement by James in which he underlines the fact
that "something permanently drastic and bitter always remains at
the bottom of (life's) cup." 311 But James, Brightman observed, was
not interested in "defining precisely the nature of the God who is
capable of improving" the human situation. He has failed to think
through the meaning of the idea of God to which he commits
himself; it "is an intuition rather than an explanation."
Brightman might-but seems not to-have quoted an even
more emphatic declaration of James in his Hibbert Lectures for

1909:
The drift of all the evidence we have seems to me to sweep us
very strongly towards the belief in some sort of superhuman life
with which we may, unknown to ourselves, be co-conscious. ...
The outlines of the superhuman consciousness thus made probably must remain, however, very vague. . . . Only one thing is
certain, and that is the result of our aiticism of the absolute:
the only way to escape from the paradoxes and perplexities that
a consistently thought-out monistic universe suffers from as from
a species of auto-intoxication . . . is to be frankly pluralistic and
assume that the superhuman consciousness, however vast it may be,
has itself an external environment, and consequently is finite..•.
The line of least resistance, then, as it seems to me, both in theology and in philosophy, is to accept, along with the superhuman
consciousness, the notion that it is not all-embracing, the notion in
other words, that there is a God, but that he is .finite, either in
power or in knowledge, or in both at once. These, I need hardly
tell you, are termS in which common men have usually carried on
their active commerce with God; and the monistic perfections that
make the notion of him so paradoxical practically and morally are
the colder additions of remote professional minds operating ;,.
tlis1,n,s upon conceptual substituces for him alone.311
Prom S. S. Laurie, who recognized "superfluous evil," Brightman
Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1954
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rook a description of God that he quores over and over again,
as "a spirit in difficulty." 37 He also admitted t0 having been
influenced strongly by Henri Bergson's conception of time as tl11ree
reeU. rather than physical space-time and - indirectly but
markedly-by Edmund Noble's P1'rf!osive E11ol111ion.88 Brightman was also aware of the finite god theory of H. G. Wells in his
book God the In11isible King (1917), but Wells is said to have
retracted it lacer; in any case he defines it so vaguely as to be
philosophically valueless.:10
Against this total background Brightman proposed his doctrine
of a finite God in The Problem of God in 1930. In 1931 The
Finding of God came out, in 1934 Person11ln1 and Religion (where
the doctrine is restated in Lecture III), and in 1940 A Philoso,Ph1
of Religion:'0
We may point out here that some of Brightman's conclusions
were anticipated by Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887),
a modem panentheist, who, while professing not to deny the
omnipotence of God, said: "I would rather take His omnipotence
to mean that He can do everything that He wills, and that everything that He wills is good. . . . I seek the cause of that which
is not good in the world outside of God's will, although not outside of God, since I rather see therein the cause against which
the might and activity of His higher will opposes itself." u
Another adumbration of Brightman's position is the "quasihuman" God of the later John Fiske.42
We might also refer to the assertions of Ludwig Paul Feuerbach
on the necessity of creation for omnipotence to realize and prove
itself. "God as God, that is, as a being not finite, not human, nor
materially conditioned, not phenomenal, is only an object of
thought. . . . Is God almighty wid1out creation? No! Omnipotence
first realizes, proves itself in creation. . . . What is omnipotence,
what all other divine attributes, if man does not exist? Man is
nOthing without God; but also, God is nothing without man; for
only in man is God an object as God; only in man is he God." 41
More recent are Charles Sander Peirce's musings that God is
omniscient "in a vague sense" and omnipotent "vaguely speaking."
With reference tO God's omniscience Peirce says that he does "nor
see why we may not assume that He refrains from knowing
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol25/iss1/2
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much." With reference to God's omnipotence he observes that
Leibnitz held "that this is the best of 'all possible' worlds. That
seems to imply some limitation upon Omnipotence. Unless others
were created, roo, it would seem that, all things considered, this
universe was the only possible one." Such questions, however,
Peirce dismisses as "gabble."'"

III
It must be kept in mind that Brightman's doctrine of a finiteinfinite God is a philosophical rather than a theological doctrine,
in the sense that it deliberately refuses to operate with authoritative
revelation and restrias itself resolutely to experimental data. In
the opinion of at least one historian of American philosophy,
Brightman "has subordinated his theism and his defense of belief
in a 'finite God' to a generalized axiology or metaphysics of
value." a
Brightman is an empiricist and a r111io1111lis1. "The belief in an
objectively real, value-seeking God" is not an a priori metaphysical
truth, but "there is an empirical basis for the hypothesis that such
a God is real, and that the basis for theism is empiricnll, more
ample and r11tion11lZ, more coherent than that for solipsism and
naturalism" (italics not original) .to
In essence, Brightman is confessedly engaged in an intellectual
making of God in the expanded image of man.
All that we can think or imagine about God is based on our experience, and there is no definite reason for supposing that any of
God's unknown atuibutes are anything other than forms of conscious experience. . . . If the structure of God's experience . . .
bears any analogy to man's, • . . his creative will would always
act under the conditions which are presented by the passive factors
in his experience, namely, the given unchanging principles of
reason, and the given eternal faas of divine sensation.•7
Experience includes all experience available to the "datum self,"
his own and the experience of all other experients to which he

bas access. For Brightman,
the empirical evidence most directly relevant to the cosmic fate
of values and hence to the power of goodness in objective reality,
is to be found in the facts of evolution - both celestial and ter·
resrrial. Astronomy gives us the former, biology the latter. . . .
Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1954
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The order, mutual adaptation, and progress in evolution, above all
the so-called "arrival of the fit," point to a power other than the
curve of probability, arriving at relevance, wholeness and value.
To deny this is to appeal to magic. But . . . the incalculable
wastage, the blind alleys, the internecine warfare, the natural
plagues and disasters, of the evolutionary process are empirically
ineradicable evidence of dysteleology.48

By this philosophical, empiricist, rationalist, evolutionist pathway he comes to his "hypothesis of a finite God, shorn of the old
attribute of omnipotence." ·111
IV
Finitism does not regard God as merely finite, as some forms of
polytheism do. It does not say of God that he is in no respect
absolutely perfect, or that he is "in all respects surpassable by
something conceivable, perhaps by others or perhaps by (himself)
in another state." GO Brightman insisted that "there arc certain
senses in which one must, on rational grounds, view God as infinite
if one adopts the hypothesis of God at all." r;i As a description of
this absolute aspect of God, most of traditional theology is acceptable to proponents of .finitism.';2
Specifically, "as regards goodness, God must be infinite, never
failing in devotion to the highest ideals." G.1
In a sense, God is omnipresent.
We can find God as a presence at all times. . . . He is present,
whether we recognize him or not, both as sustainer of our existence and as a source of what is given to us from beyond ourselves.
Yet his constant presence is also a proof of his absence; since he
is with all and in all, he is more than is ever disclosed in our
experience. He exists as absent from us because he is present in
all pasts, all futures, all beings everywhere. In adoring him, we
adore a presence that is more than presence and an absence that
is never wholly absent.r.•
Likewise, in a sense, God is omniscient. He knows "all that
can be known." GG God "must be unlimited in his knowledge of
all that is, although human freedom and the nature of The Given
probably limit his knowledge of the precise details of the future." 118
God is inexhaustible, that is, although God is not a mathematical
infinity, he, like the series of mathematical infinities, cannot be

exhausted.GT
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol25/iss1/2
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God is eternal. He ".is personal consciousness of eternal duration; his consciousness .is an eternally aaive will, which etemally
finds and controls The Given within every moment of his eternal
experience." 08
God is "infinite in time and space, by his unbegun and unending
duration and by his inclusion of all nature within his experience."•
V
TI1e issue on which absolutist and finitist thinkers part company
is "the problem of the power of goodness" - the reconciliation of
the goodness of God with the omnipotence of God. Here there
emerges for Brightman "the paradoxical truth that, though God is
infinite, his will .is finite, being limited by that in him which is not
his will." 00
. "God is the source of all being," 111 and can in a sense be regarded
as a creator. But creation in Brightman is not ex nihilo; it means
the production of novelties within divine experience, not of beings
in any way external to God.02
Brightman holds that every conscious being must have a naturea definite structure, definite properties and qualities. In the nature
of a conscious being it is possible for it to make choices; this fact
we call its will. Will is not a separate faculty or power; it is the
aa of a whole self possessing a specific nature. In the case of God,
the po,un of His will .is limited by The Given.0.1
This obviously goes farther than the traditional limitations that
even absolutists have conceded with reference to the nature of God.
Absolutists and finitists alike agree that God cannot do the inherently impossible, that He cannot make a round triangle, or a two
that being multiplied by itself makes six, or a time prior tO His
own existence. They would also agree that He is self-limited by
His own will and generally that He is limited by the free choices
of the beings He has created.0-1
Thus Canon Hastings Rashdall ( whom Brightman frequently
claimed as a personalise that believes in a finite God) uses the
term "finite God" tO emphasize certain features inherent in all
theism when he says: "God is certainly limited by all other beings
in the Universe, that .is to say, by other selves, in so far as he is
not those selves." But, he goes on, God "is not limited by anything
which does not proceed from his own Nature or Will or Power."a:i
Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1954
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Brighanan, however, went so far as to urge that "it may be
asked whether a God" conceived of as submitting himself only
tO the limitations involved by rationality and goodness and human
will "stands in a sufficiently explanatory relation to the dualisms
of experience to be either religiously satisfactory or ontologically

real." GO
'
Modem finitists, in Hartshorne's words, mean to say by "finite

God" or "imperfect God" that "the traditional idea of perfection is
erroneous, and the empirical method ( which such writers are likely
t0 profess) cannot establish any sort of perfection in God.... They
are seeking a minimal conception of God." 07
To the finitistic theorist God is not almighty.
The advance of modern thought bas compelled us to modify our
faith either in God's character or in his omnipotence. We believe
that it is far more reasonable to deny the absolute omnipotence
of the power manifesting itself in the world than to deny its
goodness. On our view, God is perfect in will, but not in achievement; perfect in power to derive good from all situations, but not
in power to determine in detail what those situations will be. It is
not a question of the kind of God we should like to have. It is
a question of the kind of God required by the facts.08
In another place, Brightman put it this way:
Divine power ... is not magical; much less is it lawless or arbitrary; and it is mistaken ro regard it as absolutely omnipotent.
God's power is best described as sufficient for man's need. God is
man's fellow sufferer. He dies every Good Friday but rises every
Easter. He experiences new Calvaries and new tombs whenever
men suffer and die; but his power is never defeated and he is able
to aeatc new life in this world and new life in the world to come.
This experience and this faith are what the power of God means.09
This single step from absolutism to finitism "involves the entire
dliference between admitting and not admitting real change,
growth, possibility of profit, suffering, true sociality, as qualities of
the divine, along with radical differences • • • in the meanings
ascribed to creation, the universe, human freedom, and in the
arguments for the existence of God." TO
Since God is not omnipotent, he is eternally perfectible.
Our finite God is not one of a finished perfection; his perfection
and the perfection of his world consist in their perfectibility. This

https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol25/iss1/2
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docs not mean that God is ever ignorant or evil in his will; he
always knows all that can be known and his will is always guided
by perfect devotion to the ide:tl of love. Yet it docs mean that he
confronts within his own experience genuine difficulties, out of
which arise the apparent defects of the physical world. On this
view, God does not deliber:itely choose the cruelties of evolution
nnd the suJferings of creation; they represent, mther, the necessary
outcome of his eternal Given nature, out of which he is always
bringing a higher good.71
An essential element of Brighanan's conception of God is that
God is temporal. This does not mean that he is not eternal; he is.
It means that he is not timeless. It rejects the idea that he is not
intimately ~lated to and concerned with events in time.72
The God of religion, from everlasting to everlasting, is a temporal
being. Indeed, it may be said that all reality, all experience,
whether human or divine, is a temporally moving present. Nothing real is a u11c slaw. Aaivity, change, dur:ition, are the essence
of the real. The real endures; the real changes; the real grows.
God is the real, or at least the most significant part of the real....
Nothing real is timeless, in the sense of being out of time, atemporal. Eternity is a function of time, not time of eternity.73
Time as Brighanan conceived of it is not the space-time of
physics. "Physical time is not an adequate basis for thought about
God," because physics tends to reduce or subordinate time to space
and by the very nature of its problem ignores personality and value
as well as the epistemological problem. Time is "the form of the
inner sense." H Temporality is one of the chief characteristics of
immediate experience.
Experience is always a duration, a real before and after; since
Bergson's exposition of "d11rct1 rt!t1lltl' and Heidegger's of "Dascirl'
and Whitehead's emphasis on process, there can be no doubt of
this. An experience which is at no time and contains no temporal
sequence is a round uiangle. . • . If God is n real being, he must
stand in real relations to our temporal experience. He must be
the ground and explanation of our time; and events in our time
must make a difference tO him. The temporal character of the self
poincs tO the temporal character of God.7;;
This is a necessary corollary of the process of evolution, which
means that time and change are of fundamental importance in
the universe.
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The only God worth believing in, ... in the light of the evidence,
is a God in living relation to the facts of cosmic and human
history. He is a God into whose very being time enters; we need
a tempor.ilistic rather th:10 a purely eternalistic view of God. Indeed, talcing evolution in the largest sense, it may be that the
development of the entire physial universe as we know it is but
an iosignifiant episode in the eternally active history of God.70
Religion as well as evolution requires "ages" of real time.
"Science needs them for the evolution of matter and mind, and
religion needs them for the unfolding of a divine plan. . . . If the
ongoing t'f history reveals God, it reveals one for whom events
happen and to whom the order of events is of real importance."
Morality is another illustration of the data from which we infer
God. "It is true that the good life is a life of loyalty to timeless
ideas; but it is even truer that the good life is a task, a development. Although ideals may be regarded as timeless, every realized
ideal is in time." 77
This is a good place to note how far and how radically Brightman departed from even his distinguished predcccssor, Borden
Parker Bowne. In Chapter IV, "The Metaphysical Attributes of
the World-Ground," of his Theism, Bowne attributed to God without any qualification ,1,,zil1 ("it is uncompounded, indivisible, and
without distinction of parts . . . [and] there is but one such fundamental existence"), t1nchangeabili11 ( "not the rigidity of a logical
category but the self-identity and self-equality of intelligence"),
omnipresence ( in the sense that space is no limitation or barrier
for God), eterni11 ("the absolute intelligence and will must lie
beyond all temporal limits and conditions as their source, but never
included in them"), 0111,,ziscience ("on the assumption of a real
time ... there is no way out [of the difficulty of foreknowledge
and freedom] unless we assume that God has ways of knowing
that are inscrutable to us. . . . On our own view of ideality and relativity of time the problem vanishes in its traditional form, and
nothing remains but the general mystery which shrouds for us
the epistemology of the Infinite and the existence of the .finite")
and omnipotence ( "God is absolute will or absolute agent, forever
determining himself according to rational and eternal principles") •11
Bowne likewise argued for the nontemporal character of God:
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol25/iss1/2
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The world-ground is, indeed, unconditioned by anything beyond
itself; but it must be conditioned by ics own nature in any case,
and the question arises whether this conditioning involves tem•
pora.l sequence in the infinite life irsclf.
To maintain the affirmative here would involve us in the gmvest
speculative difficulties. . . . [God] is not to be viewed as conditioned by time with regard to his own self-consciousness or
self-possession. . . . God in Himself, then, is not only the eternal
or ever-enduring; be is also the non-temporal, or that which tran•
scends temporal limits and conditions.70
From God's temporal character Brightman inferred limitations
on his omniscience. It is clear from the nature of consciousness, be
argued, that God must be finite. Every human consciousness is
largely determined by factors beyond its control - the past and the
environment. Freedom can be rationally defined only with reference
to such limitations, as consisting "in the choice or election of elements from a total field of expiercnce which is determined by
a power beyond our conuol." The effects of our choice are beyond
our control, although not beyond our powers of prediction and
indi.rcct control. "It is not impossible that there is something
analogous in the divine freedom, though only remotely so. With
all the creative power of God there may be something Given
in his nature as subject matter for his choice. I offer this particular
argument very diffidently." If man is truly free, God must be finite
as regards his knowlcdgc.80
At least, if our tempora.listic view of God be uue, and God is not
utterly above and beyond all time, he cannot be thought of as
knowing in advance what a free person will choosc. . . . Man's
freedom is an actual limitation on the forcknowledge of God.
A thinker no less than John Locke said: "I cannot make freedom
in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God,
though I am fully persuaded of both as of any truths I most
firmly assent to." 11
But Locke, Brighanan held, was inconsistent!

82

VI
The quotations from Brighanan up to this point have repeatedly
referred to what he calls The Given. This is one of the most important aspects of his concept of a finite God.
Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1954

15

Concordia Theological Monthly, Vol. 25 [1954], Art. 2
THE PlNITE-INFJNITE GOD OP BRIGHTMAN

48

In his Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, "An Empirical Approach to God," Brightman says that in
addition to eternal 11eritls de raison, "the will or active and purposive principle of the cosmos also confronts 11eritcs e,l /nit. Let
us call whatever is not an act or product of the will of God by the
name of The Given. God is finite, I hold, not in the sense that
The Given is ultimately external to him, as devil or Platonic matter,
but in the sense that his will is limited by formal and factual
conditions eternally given within his experience, conditions which
that will did not produce." 83
That The Given exists Brightman concluded from four types
of evidence: First, the facts of evolution; second, the nature of consciousness; third, the principle of dialectic; fourth, religious experience.
Evolution "seems to display prodigality and wastefulness." But
evolution is also obviously purposive. "We are led to say that
nature is the work of a power that is achieving its ends in the fact
of what seems to be opposition. There is evidence of design in
nature; there is also evidence of frustration of design and delay
in its achievement." 84
Arguing from the nature of consciousness, Brightman pointed
out that every stntc or process of consciousness that we know is
a combination of active and passive faaors: We do and suffer;
we choose and are determined in the same aa. "Experience consists
of form and content. There are an element of will and an element
of sensation in every moment of our life." We have to ascribe our
passive experiences to the aaion of an external world beyond us.
As subjective products they would be fantastic ravings. To acquire
meaning they muse be related objectively to an external world.
Brightman's hypothesis is that the divine life is constituted in the
way in which all known experience is constituted, namely, as
a union of active and passive elements. Since God's nature contains
within itself the explanation of the whole world, this does not
mean that God must be acted upon by some world or power external
tO himself in order to have these passive experiences analogous to
our sensations. Furthermore, if you posit a supergod who causes
this passive element, you are only under necessity of ascribing the
same division of aaive and passive to this supergod. "We must
https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol25/iss1/2
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acknowledge a duality of nature at the very eternal heart of things,
in which the active is indeed in control, but maintains its control
with struggle and pain. This view is at once nearer tO the facts
observed by science and to the Christian faith in a God who can
save only through the shedding of blood." This hypothesis accounts
for d1e fact that God "appears t0 be a spirit in difficulty; for the
active side of his nature, his rational will, confronts a problem in
the passive side of his experience." This enriches or thickens our
thought of the divine life; it is more realistic, more dramatic,
truer.Ill

Even though Hegel insisted upon the infinity and absolutcneSS
of God, the principle of dialectic argues for the existence of The
Given.
All .reality is full of opposition and contrast; everything that is
stands in contrast with something else; every thesis implies some
sort of antithesis. This means that the nature of God is to contain
opposition and tension. But every opposition leads to a higher
level of life; every struggle points to a higher meaning or synthesis.
Thus, for Hegel as for our view, the divine life consists essen•
tially of struggle and victory over opposition, a victory for which
a price has always to be paid even by God himself. The traditional
view almost inevitably engenders the idea that God's task is 11D
easy one; that he stands apart from the struggle in spotless white.
Our view sees him as the greatest sufferer in the universe and
through this the greatest viaor; his nature is not merely goodness
but also dialectic struggle, or, rather, his goodness is not merely
an abstraet quality but the constant victory of constant effort.88
A fourth type of evidence is furnished by religious experience in
particular.
The testimony of most religious experience points to something
like the finiteness we assert. It worships a God who is., on the one
hand, reasonable and good, and, on the other, mysterious and above
our comprehension. . . . It seems to be the voice of religion that
there is something above and beyond reason in the reasonable
God. • • . Rudolph Otto describes the irrational element in the
divine nature as "the numinous." This dark aspect of religion
points to a tragic reality in God. God is not simply a happy,
loving Father; he is the struggle and the mysterious pain at the
heart of life. He is indeed love; but a suffering love that redeems
through a Cross.17
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Brightman held that this evidence precludes both the traditional
theistic or a dualistic solution.BB This element of opposition cannot
be a produa of the creative will of God, chosen as the best means
of attaining his ends. Nor can it be external to God himself. For
then he must either have created it or he did not create it. If he
created it, "one needs something within the divine nature to explain
why he should create that sort of thing. If he did not, we are again
confronted with a dualism of God and The Given.80
The Given must thus be within the divine consciousness, for
"otherwise it does not explain why God has so much genuine difficulty in expressing his ideal purposes, combined with so much
control and achievement." 00
Brightman was not always as precise as he might have been
either in describing The Given or in relating it to God's nature.
Benocci traces a development between The Problem of God. and
Th, Finding of God.; in the former The Given is simply something
nonformal and retarding, while in the latter The Given includes
moral and logical necessities.111 Elsewhere The Given includes "the
laws of reason and all else." 112
Again, Brightman in The Proble11J of God. described God's nature
as incl11tlit1,g "reason, never-ending activity in time, and the rich
realm of The Given with which his will has to cope in the task
of world building and development." 03 Again he declared: "God
is eternal reason and eternal will, dealing with what I have called
the Given in his eternal experience. God's will is the creative aspect
of the universe, but that will is limited by the laws of eternal
reason ""'1, by the facts of The Eternally Given." 0• In Th, Finding
of Gotl he referred to "a necessity, an uncreated 'Given' in his
nature, which he did not produce, but is a factor with which, as
a part of his very existence, he always has to deal." OG Likewise,
in P11rsonali11 and R,ligion he spoke of "the 1ri11m,ph of the rational
will of God 011,r the passi11e ,md, chaotic side of his being." 00 But
Brightman also identified. God's nature with The Given by saying
that God's "uncreated n11l11,r,1 Th, Gi11en, plainly includes reason
and moral law." 01 (Italics not original in these quotations.)
The Given in any case, however, is, first, "not any unconscious
stuff, material substance, or mysterious entity of any sort; it is conscious experience of God." It is matter only in the sense of "conhttps://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol25/iss1/2
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scious content." 9 Brightman was nn idealist in the tradition of
Plato, of Rudolph Hermann Lotze, and of Rudolph Christoph
Eucken. He held, therefore, that the arguments for idealism make
supposition of nonmenrol or extramenrol content or matter unreasonable. "Qualitative dualism raises more problems than it
solves." The Given may be conceived of as a conscious datum or
perception, analogous to humnn sense experience, yet not produced
by any stimulus or cnuse external to God.
Just 115 human sense d:m1 create for men an ,mo11dlicho
/Ju/ gabe,
so The Given is the source of an eternal problem and msk for God.
Ir is irrational, not in the sense of containing logical contradictions
or immoml purposes, but in the sense of being given to reason as
a datum and not derived from rational premises or purposes.
In itself it cannot be understood; yer an understanding use may
be made of it, and through the conquest and shaping of it meaning may be achieved. Our hypothesis is that God can make an
incttaSingly better conquest of it throughout eternity without ever
wholly eliminating it. The divine perfection, then, is an infinite
series of perfeaings. Perfection me:ins pcrfectibiliry.00

Second, "The Given is complex; it stands for the entire uncreated
and eternal nature of God." In addition to renson and the moral
law, it includes "an empirical faaor, and eternal subject matter ...
which eternal divine thought and goodness have to reckon with in
all their dealings. . . . This Given enters as a partially distorting
and delaying faaor into every creative act of God. Time, also, is
an aspect of the complex Given." 100
Third, The Given is eternal; otherwise it would have to be a creature.~01 It is "an eternal form and an eternal content in the temporal God. . . . There is an eternal Wisdom and an eternal Cross.
Each is an enduring aspect of the unbegun and unending process
which is reality." 102
Fourth, The Given is internal to God. "It casts its shadow on his
inner life. It limits him within as tndy as without ... an uncreated
limitation within the divine nature." io:s
Fifth, The Given is controlled. Control implies subjeaion and
guidance, but not creation. "Every obstacle and delay is real; The
Given causes the world to be other than it would be if God Wm!
strialy omnipotent; it explains the presence of the horrible evils
and distortions." Divine control means a possible divine future
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beyond every frustratlon and pain. "God is not responsible for
evils which he did not will; but he is responsible for overcoming
the evils and helping man to higher levels of goodness." 104
The Given would take over many of the functions of matter,
potenciality, the devil, and what the Germans call "the irrational."
Yet there would be no dualism of scuff or of ultimate principle
in the universe; there would only be a "dualism of process" 10:;
within the Supreme Person.

VII
Brightman himself anticipated some of the objections to his
view and answered others as critics filed them.100
He conceded that the idea of a finite-infinite God might be
psychologically or "morally" impossible for many sincere minds to
accept. They would find "religious confusion, if not nonsense, in
ascribing finiteness to the infinite." For them Brightman had no
answer; the idea would simply be incompatlble with personal
religion and they would have no choice but to reject it.1°!
Others objected that it renders the goal of the universe precarious and irrational. Brightman answered that it "would cause
tactical difliculcies, not difficulties in major strategy." Taking
James' picture of God as the "cosmic chess-player," Brightman
was confident that God can figure out all possible moves and make
the one that will lead to viaory for his cause.108
Again, religious experience and reason allegedly demand an
absolute God. Brightman admitted that "there is a certain majesty
in the very absoluteness of such a God which is both religiously
and aesthecically sacisfying and uplifcing," while the "unity and
coherence of the universe on this view make it appeal to reason." 100
Yet he urged that the experience of both myscics and praccical
people, of philosophers and theologians, among Christians, Jews
and Hindus, testifies that religious faith does not require us to have
an absolutely true or even any one idea about God to serve as a
source of genuine religious life. Sincere, fruitful, and enduring religious experiences have come to men with utterly divergent ideas
about God.110 "Life without any beliefs is impossible; and religious
life is impossible without religious beliefs." While religious experience is not dependent on knowing the absolute truth, it is dependent both on the accion of absolute reality on us and in us, and
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on our attitude toward the divine. Our attitude will include the
sincerity with which we hold our beliefs and seek for truth.111 He
urged that most religious believers have regarded God as finite;
that every desire must be subjected to the dialectic of reason and
fact; that the objective of religious worship is a perfect ideal rather
than a perfect power; and that there are certain positive religious
values that attach to the idea of a finite God.m
Some aitics condemned the docuine of a finite God as an
anduopomorphlsm, as an evasion, not a solution, that merely translates man's problem into God's dimension. Brightman's answer
was that "we face real problems which we cannot solve; God also
faces real problems, but he can solve them all." 113
Other objections, all based upon a measure of misunderstanding
of the implications of Brightman's concept of a finite-infinite God,
are the alleged failure to absolve God of responsibility for creation,
its presumed implication that God has developed from zero, and
the supposed unworthiness of man as an object of divine love.114
Ultimately some questions remained unanswered and unanswerable. The effort to evade an ethical dualism in the universe by
positing a "dualism of process" in God merely projected the problem one step farther back. In addition, the fact that The Given
was merely a substantivized perfect passive participle was more than
a matter of the morphology of the English language. It involved
a basic semantic question: Who is the Giver of The Given?

VII
To a Christian in the conservative tmdition of Catholic, \Vcstem,
and Lutheran theology, the mere statement of Brightman's position
is enough to make a theological refutation of it unnecessary.
Belief in the finite-infinite God of Edgar Sheffield Brightman
is wholly inconsistent with belief in the infinite God of the Sacred
Scriptures (1 Kings8:27; Job42:2; Ps.102:26,27; 115:3; 135:6;
139:4; 147:5; Is. 40:28; 46:9, 10; 57:15; Matt. 19:26; Mark
14:36; Luke 1:37; 2 Peter 3:8; 1 John 1:5; 3:20; Rev. 19:6).
It is inconsistent with the Catholic Creeds.
It is inconsistent with the Symbolical Books of the Lutheran
Church (Augsburg Confession and Apology, Articles I, III, XIX;
Large and Small Catechisms, Creed, First Article; Smalcald Articles,
Part I; Formula of Concord, Articles I, VIII, XI).
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Brightman would have been prompt to concede this, since he
said: "An omnipotent and absolutely infinite God could be revealed
only to an " priori faith," nG which includes faith based on
revelation.
The major theological weakness of Brightman's hypothesis lies
in its refusal to admit revelation, either through the Incarnation
and the Atonement of Our Blessed Lord or through the Sacred
Scriptures, as an authoritative and objective element in religious
experience.
Its major theological significance lies in two areas:
Negatively, it has helped to widen the growing chasm between
Nicene orthodoxy and modern Protestantism.
Posit~vely, it has furnished additional evidence of the logical
inadequacy of the traditional apologetics as soon as it goes beyond
demonstrating the necessity of God's existence and attempts to
determine concretely the attributes of the God who must exist,
such as omnipotence, omniscience, eternity, or goodness. The only
soteriologically, therefore 'l'eally, significant knowledge that we have
of God is that which we have in Christ Jesus. But in His Holy
Face we see the glory of a God who transcends the alternatives
that Brightman presented, the malicious God of Schopenhauer or
the schizophrenic Deity of his own hypothesis: We see the God
who in Quist was reconciling the world to Himself, not counting
their trespasses against them.
St. Louis, Mo.
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